historical events that build a basic understanding of the nature and logic behind Iran's behavior.
The proposed U.S. response is based on the analysis that the Iranian regime's behavioral tendencies are pragmatic and likely to remain consistent with their past actions.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic state with Supreme Leader Khamenei as the final decision maker on all Iranian foreign policies, no matter how much noise President Ahmadinejad makes. Along with the Supreme Leader, a small group of appointed clerics are the true centers of power in Iran. Regime survival is the driving factor for how the Iranian leadership behaves and responds as a state. The Iranian leadership views threats to its survival through lenses that have been shaped by a deep-rooted distrust of Western states, especially the U.S., and struggle to maintain domestic legitimacy.
The Iranian regime's calculations on what it will gain from nuclear weapons is not a question of how responsible they will be, but a question of how they view their military options in light of Iran's interests, with primacy given to regime survival. There is strong evidence to support the idea that the Iranian leadership would perceive their options for nuclear weapons as for defensive purposes only.
Indications also point to the conclusion that Iran can be deterred and that positive internal reform is inevitable but will occur at Iran's own pace. Given its offensive and defensive advantages, the U.S. should accept the fact that it has the option to comfortably wait this one out iii AU/ACSC/Glenn/AY09 while Iran changes within. A grand strategy of containment would allow the U.S. to frame the nuclear Iran issue within the context of a long-term, consistent policy towards a stable Middle East region.
iv AU/ACSC/Glenn/AY09 For more than three decades, serious efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East have continued to show no meaningful evidence of success. 1 Unless things drastically change in the Middle East and legitimate peace is established between Israel and all of its regional neighbors, then it is only a matter of time before Israel's asymmetrical weight of military power is balanced by another state in the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the most serious contender in the region that is seeking such a balance of nonconventional military power. This research will avoid the endless speculation of attempting to determine what a closed state like Iran has or does not have with respect to nuclear weapons capability, and is written from the perspective that Iran has already crossed the horizontal nuclear weapon threshold and has begun to build up its arsenal.
Therefore, now is the time to consider what U.S. national security policy should look like once Iran has nuclear weapons. My contention is that the grand strategy of containment is the most promising policy the U.S. can adopt in dealing with a nuclear Iran. Leader Khamenei's greatest fear for Iran is that "it will face international sanctions that will limit or preclude the trade, aid, and investment it so desperately requires to keep its foundering economy afloat." 29 This fear is based on the possibility that the regime could lose its hold on power in Iran if the poor economy feeds into a public uprising. 30 This internal threat to the regime's survival is significant with Iran's massive youth bulge entering the workforce . 31 Substantial losses of hundreds of thousands of Iran's youth during the Iran-Iraq War created a void or bathtub effect on its population. Iran is now coming out of this effect and, on its own, cannot create enough jobs for the large number of new workers. 32 The resulting high unemployment rate has caused unease with the regime, whose leadership presides over one of the highest brain drains in the world (~150,000 professionals a year emigrate). 33 "The technocrats who manage Iran's economy have warned that only massive, foreign investment ($20 billion a year) will be needed just to keep the status quo from deteriorating any further." 34 This reality has led some pragmatic members of the regime to encourage more amiable relations with the U.S. than does the often too belligerent Ahmadinejad. 35 Advisors to Ayatollah Khamenei, such as Muhammad Javad Larijani have stated, "We and the U.S. have many differences. But this does not mean that we cannot adopt a regular policy in view of our national interests." 36 Khatami, former Iranian President, echoed this realist perspective by claiming, "From our point of view there are no obstacles preventing economic cooperation with the U.S." 37 The youth of Iran are a source of another fear of the Iranian regime, i.e., the gradual loss of legitimacy of the Islamic revolution among the general population. Only a year after the 1979
Islamic revolution, Iran found itself in a costly war with Iraq. The war, which stemmed from the threat of expanding revolution itself, dragged on for eight years and ended poorly for the regime. 38 Twenty-nine years since the revolution, which promised a more just society 39 that "nurtured the noble and universal values of Islam," 40 the regime has delivered human suffering in war and a poor economic system. The economy is based on a rampant bribe-taking culture 41 and "benefits only an elite group of clerics and their cronies." 42 The new generation of Iranians, who are under 26 years old and make up half the population, are moving away from the Khomeinist religious themes and clichés. 43 This disillusionment of the youth represents a significant issue for regime leaders, since "throughout its tenure, popular will, however circumscribed by theological fiat, remained an important arbiter of the Iranian state's legitimacy and thus its very survival." Iran is a country of contradictions and paradoxes. It is both grandiose in its selfperception yet intensely insecure. It seeks to lead the region while remaining largely suspicious and disdainful of its neighbors. Its rhetoric is infused with revolutionary dogma, yet its actual conduct is practical, if not realistic. A perennial struggle between aspirations and capabilities, hegemony and pragmatism has characterized Iran's uneasy approach to the Greater Middle East. 45 It is in this context that the U.S. should attempt to understand Iranian domestic and foreign conduct.
Iran's calculations on nuclear weapons
In order to formulate a proper response to a nuclear Iran, it is necessary to understand what
Iran perceives it will gain with its nuclear weapons. The theocratic government's fundamental expectation of nuclear weapons is regime survival. Since Iran and the Shia Islam religion are completely interwoven and essentially synonymous, the regime stands as Shia Islam's authority in the world and its existence is directly linked to the will of God. 46 "Thus the survival of this government and its form is an existential imperative as well as an expression of self-interest and Iranian nationalism." 47 The Iranian leadership has learned lessons from how differently the U.S.
and the international community have handled states with and without nuclear weapons. They "believe that the only way to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic--and its ideals--is to equip it with an independent nuclear capability." 48 As a result, Iran's nuclear weapon efforts are fueled by their desire to prevent the U.S. from successfully influencing, either overtly or covertly, a change of regime. being "bogged down" in Iraq, Iran has a primary security strategy that is still based on deterrence. 56 The Iranian leadership sees a nuclear weapon capability as a means to create a viable deterrent posture that could address a wider range of threats. 57 Iranian exile, Shahram
Chubin, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Director, 58 believes the Iranian leadership wants to use a nuclear arsenal to serve as a general hedge from external threats. 59 Another reason to believe Iran would only use its nuclear weapons for defensive purposes is that Iran has long possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has not employed them in an offensive or aggressive manner. 60 Iran sees the chemical weapons arsenal that it maintains as a means of deterrence and not "an instrument of an aggressive, revolutionary foreign policy designed to project its power abroad." 61 What Iran likely will not do with its nuclear weapons is give them to terrorist organizations.
According to most experts on Iran, it is not likely that the leadership would share its nuclear weapons with anyone, including foreign terrorists, simply because of the punishment it has gone through to build its arsenal. 62 68 This past behavior has caused concern among some who believe that a nuclear Iran would initiate a nuclear strike to bring about its own martyrdom. However, Iranian leadership seems to have reached the limits of its sacrificial theory during the closing months of the Iran-Iraq war when it "began to threaten the theocratic edifice through popular disenchantment, demoralized youth, and grumblings within the armed forces." 69 The devastating human toll Iran had paid and the loss of zeal for selfsacrifice invalidated the martyrdom approach. 70 Jahangir Amuzegar claims the concern over
Iran's martyrdom principle should be put into context: "Some pundits argue that a Shiite belief in martyrdom, coupled with the Iranian regime's extremist ideology, could render deterrence meaningless. Such people know neither Shiite martyrdom nor the regime leaders' instinct for self-preservation, nor even the mullah's bazaari habit of always looking for the best deal." But what does the Iranian leadership perceive it will gain by having nuclear weapons?
Currently, Iran's conventional military force is several generations of capability behind U.S.
forces. First and foremost, Iran believes that nuclear weapons will enable it to no longer be vulnerable to a U.S. conventional military attack. 72 To put in perspective the gap in conventional could not do in over 8 years and at a cost of perhaps a million casualties. 73 The Iranian leadership views the development of nuclear weapons as a way to bridge this conventional gap without having to build a competitive conventional force. 74 Since Iranian leadership perceives that nuclear weapons will be a credible deterrent to any U.S. conventional attack, they believe the door will be opened for Iran to assume its rightful place as the regional hegemon in the Middle East. 75 Iran's preeminent sense of identity can be found by observing its heritage and connection to the Persian Empire, "one of the world's greatest superpowers with a monotheistic religion, rich civilization, vast army, elite forms of governance and a wide and expansive territory." 76 Because of their history and the past prestige of their civilization, Iranians believe they have a special providence to establish regional dominance as a nation. 77 The only obstacle to Iran's regional hegemonic ambition is the U.S., which is fully entrenched in the Middle East. and insecurity by preventing any significant U.S. opposition to their foreign policy agenda. 84 Logic for Iranian leadership's view is based on U.S. behavior towards states that have nuclear weapons compared to those that do not. Kenneth Waltz, one of the most prominent U.S. scholars on international relations, hypothesizes that, "if a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years." 85 Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. has invaded and overthrown the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which do not have nuclear weapons, but has avoided military action against North Korea, which already had nuclear weapons. 86 In fact, the U.S. has "conceded to multilateral negotiations with
Pyongyang with an offer of economic incentives and security guarantees." 87 Some experts believe that Iran sees an opportunity to "use" nuclear weapons as a means to amplify its diplomatic leverage within the region as the Soviets used their nuclear weapons in the Cold War by "complicating but not erasing the effects of American military commitments." 88 With such perceived incentives that would enable Iran to leverage an improved negotiating position and counter its external vulnerabilities, one can understand how the Iranian leadership would be impervious to immediate political costs in the quest of "the ultimate weapon of deterrence." 89 Finally, the Iranian leadership perceives nuclear weapons as a means to solving its internal political factionalism. 90 The Islamic regime hopes that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will
give its clerical leaders the credentials they need to shore up their hold on power and slow the momentum of reformers who want to "liberalize Iranian society and [its] economy." 91 Iranian nuclear weapons would be a source of national prestige and benefit politicians among voters who overwhelming see nuclear weapons as a means of security.
Iran is desperate for empowerment, 92 but not desperate for strategic martyrdom 93 or regime suicide. 94 Waltz stated, "If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object of great worry." 95 Since Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, where it considers itself isolated and surrounded by external threats, 96 the Iranian leadership sees a nuclear capability as "a credible deterrent and a valuable insurance policy" 97 for regime survival, 98 not as a means to an offensive, first-strike opportunity. 99 All this points to the conclusion that Iran can be deterred, 100 and that it would act responsibly with nuclear weapons. 101 The U.S. was certainly suspicious of the Soviet and Chinese leaders before they had nuclear weapons, but they both have acted responsibly. 102 In fact, according to Waltz, every state that has gained a nuclear weapon capability after the U.S., has used them for "one purpose and only one purpose, and that's deterrence." 103 Indications that Iran will posture its nuclear weapon capability for defensive purposes only, that its pragmatic decision makers act rationally and, like the Soviets and Chinese, that they can be deterred leads to the final question:
How should the U.S. respond and what should be the U.S. grand strategy?
U.S. response
Collin Gray, one of the West's preeminent civilian strategists, points out that the U.S. is anything but helpless when it comes to dealing with states with nuclear weapons. The U.S. has within its means the ability to establish "robustly layered offensive and defensive counterforce 111 In the view of Soviet leadership, it logically followed that the best method to run a repressive government was a dictatorship, which could be excused, in their minds, by painting an international picture filled with "evil, hostile and menacing" external states that all threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union. 112 Kennan argued that the Soviets would not "yield to any form of rational persuasion or assurance" 113 because of their extreme suspicion.
Similarly, Iran's sense of insecurity and suspicion, which is a product of repeated invasion by foreign armies, 114 indicates that it is currently not ready for bargaining. 115 However, Takeyh strongly believes that, despite the ebb and flow of the reformist movement in Iran, democratic change is inevitable, but "must come on its own terms, and at its own pace." 116 Until that time, the U.S. should maintain the standoff and patiently wait for internal change in Iran, while containing any attempt by the regime to export terrorism or nuclear weapons. This standoff will require the U.S. to remain focused on the desired stable end state for the region and to maintain a foreign policy that is based on reality, using facts, logic and analysis rather than emotions and rhetoric. 117 Negotiations are the ultimate objective of the strategy of containment. 118 Accordingly, the U.S. should put a credible bargain on the negotiating table and leave it there, even though Iran is not ready for it now. The offer from the U.S. should be what Iran needs most, foreign investment to create jobs for Iranians. 119 This offer would be a tangible indication of U.S. good will to Iran. "The Iranian people need to understand that it is the West (including the United States) that seeks a speedy resolution of mutual differences, and it is the hard-liners in their own regime who refuse to do so." 120 Reformists could leverage this choice to strengthen their case against the hard-liners with the Iranian population and provoke the regime to change. Historical evidence supports the idea that the Iranian regime's behavioral tendencies are likely to remain consistent with their past actions 127 and that it will be responsible with its nuclear weapons and only use them for defensive purposes. Accepting a long term standoff between the U.S. and Iran based on a policy of containment would allow the inevitable internal changes in Iran to play out.
